CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks by Moghimi, Ahmad et al.
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks
Ahmad Moghimi
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
amoghimi@wpi.edu
Gorka Irazoqui
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
girazoki@wpi.edu
Thomas Eisenbarth
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
teisenbarth@wpi.edu
Abstract
In modern computing environments, hardware resources
are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely
used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security prob-
lems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed
SGX to create a trusted execution environment within the
processor. SGX relies on the hardware, and claims run-
time protection even if the OS and other software com-
ponents are malicious. However, SGX disregards side-
channel attacks. We introduce a powerful cache side-
channel attack that provides system adversaries a high
resolution channel. Our attack tool named CacheZoom
is able to virtually track all memory accesses of SGX en-
claves with high spatial and temporal precision. As proof
of concept, we demonstrate AES key recovery attacks
on commonly used implementations including those that
were believed to be resistant in previous scenarios. Our
results show that SGX cannot protect critical data sen-
sitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is
possible in a practical environment. In contrast to pre-
vious works which require hundreds of measurements,
this is the first cache side-channel attack on a real sys-
tem that can recover AES keys with a minimal number
of measurements. We can successfully recover AES keys
from T-Table based implementations with as few as ten
measurements.1
1 Motivation
In the parallel computing environment, processes with
various trust and criticality levels are allowed to run con-
currently and share system resources. Proliferation of
cloud computing technology elevated these phenomena
to the next level. Cloud computers running many dif-
ferent services authored by various providers process
user information on the same hardware. Traditionally,
1 Publication This work is accepted at the Conference on Crypto-
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2017) [39].
the operating system (OS) provides security and privacy
services. In cloud computing, cloud providers and the
hypervisor also become part of the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB). Due to the high complexity and various at-
tack surfaces in modern computing systems, keeping an
entire system secure is usually unrealistic [19, 33].
One way to reduce the TCB is to outsource security-
critical services to Secure Elements (SE), a separate
trusted hardware which usually undergoes rigorous au-
diting. Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), for example,
provide services such as cryptography, secure boot, seal-
ing data and attestation beyond the authority of the OS
[40]. However, SEs come with their own drawbacks:
they are static components and connected to the CPU
over an untrusted bus. Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE) are an alternative, which provide similar services
within the CPU. A TEE is an isolated environment to
run software with a higher trust level than the OS. The
software running inside a TEE has full access to the sys-
tem resources while it is protected from other applica-
tions and the OS. Examples include ARM TrustZone [4]
and Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) [29]. Intel
SGX creates a TEE on an untrusted system by only trust-
ing the hardware in which the code is executed. Trusted
code is secured in an enclave, which is encrypted and au-
thenticated by the hardware. The CPU decrypts and ver-
ifies enclave code and data as it is moved into the cache.
That is, enclaves are logically protected from malicious
applications, the OS, and physical adversaries monitor-
ing system buses. However, Intel SGX is not protected
against attacks that utilize hardware resources as a side
channel [28]. And indeed, first proposed works showing
that microarchitectural side channels can be exploited in-
clude attacks using page table faults [53] and the branch
prediction unit [34].
Caches have become a very popular side channel in
many scenarios, including mobile [35] and cloud envi-
ronments [26]. Reasons include that Last Level Cache
(LCC) attacks perform well in cross-core scenarios on
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Intel machines. Another advantage of cache attacks are
the high spatial resolution they provide. This high spa-
tial resolution, combined with a good temporal reso-
lution, have enabled attacks on major asymmetric im-
plementations, unless they are optimized for constant
memory accesses. For symmetric cryptography, the sce-
nario is more challenging. A software AES implemen-
tation can be executed in a few hundred cycles, while a
Prime+Probe cycle on the LLC takes about 2000 cycles
to monitor a single set. To avoid the undersampling, syn-
chronized attacks first prime, trigger a single encryption
and then probe, yielding at best one observation per en-
cryption [37]. Higher resolution is only possible in OS
adversarial scenarios.
1.1 Our Contribution
We demonstrate not only that Intel SGX is vulnerable
to cache attacks, but show that with SGX, the quality of
information retrieved is significantly improved. The im-
proved resolution enables attacks that are infeasible in
previous scenarios, e.g., cloud environments. We utilize
all the capabilities that SGX assumes an attacker has, i.e.,
full access to OS resources. We construct a tool2 named
CacheZoom that is able to interrupt the victim every few
memory accesses, thereby collecting high-resolution in-
formation about all memory accesses that the target en-
clave makes by applying Prime+Probe attack in the L1
cache. The usage of core-private resources does not re-
duce the applicability of the attack, as the compromised
OS schedules both victim and attacker in the same core.
While tracking memory accesses of enclave with high
temporal and spatial resolution has many adversarial sce-
narios, we demonstrate the power of this side channel
by attacking several AES implementations. Further, we
show that adopted countermeasures in popular crypto-
graphic libraries, like cache prefetching and implemen-
tations with small memory footprint, not only do not pre-
vent attacks, but can facilitate attacker’s observation. In
short, this work:
• Presents a powerful and low-noise side channel im-
plemented through the L1 cache. We exploit several
capabilities corresponding to the compromised OS.
This side channel can be applied against TEEs to
recover fine grained information about memory ac-
cesses, which often carry sensitive data.
• Demonstrates the strength of our side channel by
recovering AES keys with fewer traces than ever
in previous attacks, and further, by attacking im-
plementations considered resistant against cache at-
tacks.
2CacheZoom source and data sets: https://github.com/
vernamlab/CacheZoom
• Shows that some of the countermeasures that were
supposed to protect AES implementations, e.g.
prefetching and S-box implementations, are not ef-
fective in the context of SGX. In fact, prefetching
can even ease the retrieval of memory traces.
2 Background
This section covers topics that help understand the side
channel used to retrieve sensitive information. We dis-
cuss the basic functionality of Intel SGX and possible
microarchitectural attacks that can be deployed against
it.
2.1 How Intel SGX Works
Intel introduced SGX, a new subset of hardware instruc-
tions that allows execution of software inside isolated
environments called enclaves with the release of Sky-
lake generation. Enclaves are isolated from other com-
ponents running on the same hardware, including OSs.
SGX has recently gained attention of the security com-
munity and various SGX-based solutions have been pro-
posed [5, 7, 45].
Enclave modules can be shipped as part of an un-
trusted application and can be utilized by untrusted com-
ponents of the application. The untrusted component in-
teracts with the system software, which dedicates spe-
cific trusted memory regions for the enclave. After that,
the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of enclave
are provided and measured by the hardware. Any un-
trusted code base, including the OS, has no control over
the trusted memory region. Untrusted applications can
only use specific instructions to call the trusted compo-
nent through predefined interfaces. This design helps de-
velopers to benefit from the hardware isolation for secu-
rity critical applications.
SGX is designed to protect enclaves from malicious
users that gain root access to an OS. Memory pages be-
longing to an enclave are encrypted in DRAM and pro-
tected from a malicious OS snooping on them. Pages
are only decrypted when they are processed by the CPU,
e.g., when they are moved to the caches. In short, SGX
assumes only the hardware to be trusted; any other agent
is considered susceptible of being malicious. Upon en-
clave creation, virtual memory pages that can only map
to a protected DRAM region (called the Enclave Page
Cache) are reserved. The OS is in charge of the mem-
ory page mapping; however, SGX detects any malicious
mapping performed by it. In fact, any malicious action
from the OS will be stored by SGX and is verifiable by
third party agents.
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2.2 Microarchitectural Attacks in SGX
Despite all the protection that SGX offers, the documen-
tation specifically claims that side channel attacks were
not considered under the threat scope of its design. In
fact, although dealing with encrypted memory pages,
the cache utilization is performed similar to decrypted
mode and concurrently to any other process in the sys-
tem. This means that the hardware resources can be uti-
lized as side channels by both malicious enclaves and
OSs. While enclave-to-enclave attacks have several simi-
larities to cross-VM attacks, malicious OS-to-enclave at-
tacks can give attackers a new capability not observed
before: virtually unlimited temporal resolution. The OS
can interrupt the execution of enclave processes after ev-
ery small number of memory accesses to check the hard-
ware utilization, as just the TLB (but no other hardware
resources) is flushed during context switches. Further,
while cross-core attacks gained huge popularity in others
scenarios for not requiring core co-residency, a compro-
mised OS can assign an enclave any affinity of its choice,
and therefore use any core-private resource. Thus, while
SGX can prevent untrusted software to perform Direct
Memory Access (DMA) attacks, it also gives almost full
resolution for exploitation by hardware side channels.
For instance, an attacker can exploit page faults to learn
about the memory page usage of the enclave. Further she
can create contention and snoop on the utilization of any
core-private and core-shared resource, including but not
limited to Branch Prediction Units (BPUs), L1 caches or
LLCs [1, 36, 42]. Further, although applicable in other
scenarios [10], enclave execution mode does not update
the Hardware Performance Counters, and these can not
provide (at least directly) information about the isolated
process.
From the aforementioned resources, cache gives the
most information. Unlike page faults, which at most will
give a granularity of 4 kB, cache hits/misses can give
64 byte utilization granularity. In addition, while other
hardware resources like Branch Prediction Units (BPU)
can only extract branch dependent execution flow infor-
mation, cache attacks can extract information from any
memory access. Although most prior work targets the
LLC for being shared across cores, this is not necessary
in SGX scenarios, local caches are as applicable as LLC
attacks. Further, because caches are not flushed when the
enclave execution is interrupted, the OS can gain almost
unlimited timing resolution.
2.3 The Prime+Probe Attack
The Prime+Probe attack was first introduced as a spy
process capable of attacking core-private caches [42]. It
was later expanded to recover RSA keys [2], keystrokes
and ElGamal keys across VMs [44, 56]. As our attack is
carried out in the L1 caches, we do not face some hurdles
(e.g. slices) that an attacker would have to overcome.
The Prime+Probe attack stages include:
• Prime: in which the attacker fills the entire cache
or a small portion of it with her own dummy data.
• Victim Access: in which the attacker waits for the
victim to make accesses to particular sets in the
cache, hoping to see key dependent cache utiliza-
tion. Note that, in any case, victim accesses to
primed sets will evict at least one of the attackers
dummy blocks from the set.
• Probe: in which the attacker performs a per-set
timed re-access of the previously primed data. If
the attacker observes a high probe time, she deduces
that the cache set was utilized by the victim. On the
contrary, if the attacker observes low access times,
she deduces that all the previously primed memory
blocks still reside in the cache, i.e., it was not uti-
lized by the victim.
Thus, the Prime+Probe methodology allows an at-
tacker to guess the cache sets utilized by the victim. This
information can be used to mount a full key recovery
attack if the algorithm has key-dependent memory ac-
cesses translated into different cache set accesses.
3 Related Work
Timing side-channel attacks have been studied for
many years. On a local area network, the timing of the
decryption operation on a web server could reveal infor-
mation about private keys stored on the server [15]. Tim-
ing attacks are capable of breaking important cryptog-
raphy primitives, such as exponentiation and factoriza-
tion operations of Diffie-Hellman and RSA [32]. More
specifically, microarchitectural timing side channels
have been explored extensively [21]. The first attacks
proposed were based on the timing difference between
local core-private cache misses and hits. Generally,
cache timing attacks are based on the fact that a spy
process can measure the differences in memory access
times. These attacks are proposed to recover cryptog-
raphy keys of ciphers such as DES [51], AES [11]
and RSA [43]. Although there exist solutions to make
cryptographic implementation resistant to cache attacks
[13, 42], most of these solutions result in worse perfor-
mance. Further, cache attacks are capable of extracting
information from non-cryptographic applications [57].
More recent proposals applied cache side channels on
shared LLC, a shared resource among all the cores. This
is important as, compared to previous core-private at-
tacks, LLC attacks are applicable even when attacker and
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victim reside in different cores. The Flush+Reload [8,54]
attack on LLC is only applicable to systems with shared
memory. These side channels can be improved by per-
formance degradation [3, 24]. Flush+Reload can be ap-
plied across VMs [31], in Platform as a service (PaaS)
clouds [57] and on smartphones [35]. The Flush+Reload
is constrained by the memory deduplication requirement.
On the other hand, Prime+Probe [36], shows that in
contrast to the previous core-private cache side channels
and the Flush+Reload attack, practical attacks can be
performed without memory deduplication or a core co-
residency requirement. The Prime+Probe attack can be
implemented from virtually any cloud virtual machines
running on the same hardware. The attacker can iden-
tify where a particular VM is located on the cloud in-
frastructure such as Amazon EC2, create VMs until a
co-located one is found [44, 55] and perform cross-VM
Prime+Probe attacks [30]. Prime+Probe can also be
mounted from a browser using JavaScript [41] and as
a malicious smartphone application [35]. In addition
to caches, other microarchitectural components such as
Branch Target Buffers (BTB) are vulnerable to side
channels [1, 34]. BTB can be exploited to determine
if a branch has been taken by a target process or not,
e.g. to bypass Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) [20].
Security of Intel SGX has been analyzed based on the
available public resources [17]. A side channel resistant
TCB is proposed in the literature [18]. However, the pro-
posed solution requires significant changes to the design
of the processor. Similar to Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone
is vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks [35]. Control-
Channel attacks [53] have been proposed using the page-
fault mechanism. An adversarial OS can introduce page
faults to a target application and, based on the timing of
the accessed page, the execution flow of a target can be
inferred at page size granularity. Page fault side channels
are effective on SGX and can be defeated using software
solutions [49] or by exploiting Intel Transactional Syn-
chronization Extensions (TSX) [48]. Race conditions
between two running threads inside an enclave can be
exploited [52]. SGX-Shield [47] proposes protection by
adding ASLR protection and introduces software diver-
sity inside an enclave. Several Cache attacks on SGX
have recently and concurrently been shown, e.g. on
AES [22] and RSA [12]. While those works also exploit
core co-location and L1 cache leakage, they fall short
of exposing the full temporal and spatial resolution and
thus focus on known vulnerable implementations and at-
tack styles. An enclave-to-enclave attack through LLC in
a different adversarial scenario [46], as well as methods
to detect privileged side-channel attacks from within an
enclave [16] have concurrently been proposed.
4 Creating a High-resolution Side Channel
on Intel SGX
We explain how to establish a high resolution channel on
a compromised OS to monitor an SGX enclave. We first
describe attacker capabilities, then our main design goals
and how our malicious kernel driver is implemented. We
finally test the resolution of our proposed side channel.
4.1 Attacker Capabilities
In our attack, we assume that the adversary has root ac-
cess to a Linux OS running SGX. The attacker is capable
of installing kernel modules and configuring boot prop-
erties of the machine. As consequence of root access,
the attacker can read the content of static binary on the
disk, observe which symmetric cipher and implementa-
tion is used, and identify offset of tables that static data
from the victim binary will occupy.3 Although the at-
tacker can observe the binary, she has no knowledge of
the cipher key used during the encryption. In addition,
the attacker is capable of synchronizing the enclave ex-
ecution with CacheZoom. These assumptions are rea-
sonable, as SGX promises a trusted environment for ex-
ecution on untrusted systems. Symmetric keys can be
generated at runtime from a secure random entropy (us-
ing RDRAND instruction) and/or transferred through a
public secure channel without the attacker knowledge.
4.2 CacheZoom Design
To create a high bandwidth channel with minimal noise,
(1) we need to isolate the attackers’ malicious spy pro-
cess code and the target enclave’s trusted execution from
the rest of the running operations and (2) we need to per-
form the attack on small units of execution. By having
these two elements, even a comparably small cache like
L1 turns into a high capacity channel. Note that our
spy process monitors the L1D data cache, but can also
be implemented to monitor the L1I instruction cache or
LLC. Our spy process is designed to profile all the sets
in the L1D cache with the goal of retrieving maximum
leakage. In order to avoid noise, we dedicate one phys-
ical core to our experimental setup, i.e., to the attacker
Prime+Probe code and the victim enclave process. All
other running operations on the system, including OS
services and interrupts, run on the remaining cores. Fur-
thermore, CacheZoom forces the enclave execution to be
interrupted in short time intervals, in order to identify
all enclave memory accesses. Note that, the longer the
victim enclave runs without interruption, the higher the
3If the enclave binary is obfuscated, position of tables needs to be
reconstructed using reverse engineering methods, e.g. by analyzing
cache access patterns [26].
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number of accesses made to the cache, implying higher
noise and less temporal resolution. CacheZoom should
further reduces other possible sources of noise, e.g., con-
text switches. The main purpose is that the attacker can
retrieve most of the secret dependent memory accesses
made by the target enclave. Since the L1 cache is virtu-
ally addressed, knowing the offset with respect to a page
boundary is enough to know the accessed set.
4.3 CacheZoom Implementation
We explain technical details behind the implementation
of CacheZoom, in particular, how the noise sources are
limited and how we increase the time resolution to obtain
clean traces.
4.3.1 Enclave-Attack Process Isolation
Linux OS schedules different tasks among available log-
ical processors by default. The main scheduler func-
tion __schedule is triggered on every tick of the logi-
cal processor’s local timer interrupt. One way to remove
a specific logical processor from the default schedul-
ing algorithm is through the kernel boot configuration
isolcpus which accepts a list of logical cores to be ex-
cluded from scheduling. To avoid a logical core from
triggering the scheduling algorithm on its local timer in-
terrupt, we can use nohz_full boot configuration op-
tion. Recall that reconfiguring the boot parameters and
restarting the OS is included in our attackers capabili-
ties. However, these capabilities are not necessary, as we
can walk through the kernel task tree structure and turn
the PF_NO_SETAFFINITY flag off for all tasks. Then, by
dynamically calling the kernel sched_setaffinity in-
terface for every task, we are able to force all the running
kernel and user tasks to execute on specific cores. In ad-
dition to tasks and kernel threads, interrupts also need to
be isolated from the target core. Most of the interrupts
can be restricted to specific cores except for the non-
maskable interrupts (NMIs), which can’t be avoided.
However, in our experience, their occurrence is negligi-
ble and does not add considerable amount of noise.
CPU frequency has a more dynamic behavior in mod-
ern processors. Our target processor has Speedstep tech-
nology which allows dynamic adjustment of processor
voltage and C-state, which allows different power man-
agement states. These features, in addition to hyper-
threading (concurrent execution of two threads on the
same physical core), make the actual measurement of
cycles through rdtsc less reliable. Cache side channel
attacks that use this cycle counter are affected by the dy-
namic CPU frequency. In non-OS adversarial scenarios,
these noise sources have been neglected thus forcing the
attacker to do more measurements. In our scenario, these
processor features can be disabled through the computer
BIOS setup or can be configured by the OS to avoid un-
predictable behavior. In our attack, we simply disable ev-
ery second logical processor to practically avoid hyper-
threading. To maintain a stable frequency in spite of the
available battery saving and frequency features, we set
the CPU scaling governor to performance and limit the
maximum and minimum frequency range.
4.3.2 Increasing the time resolution
Aiming at reducing the number of memory accesses
made by the victim between two malicious OS inter-
rupts, we use the local APIC programmable interrupt,
available on phyisical cores. The APIC timer has dif-
ferent programmable modes but we are only interested
in the TSC-Deadline mode. In TSC deadline mode,
the specified TSC value will cause the local APIC to
generate a timer IRQ once the CPU reaches it. In the
Linux kernel, the function lapic_next_deadline is
responsible for setting the next deadline on each inter-
rupt. The actual interrupt handler routine for this IRQ
is local_apic_timer_interrupt. In order to en-
able/disable our attack, we install hooks on these two
functions. By patching the null function calls, available
for the purpose of live patching, we can redirect these
functions to the malicious routines in our kernel modules
at runtime.
ffffffff81050900 lapic_next_deadline
ffffffff81050900: callq null_sub1
ffffffff81050c90 local_apic_timer_interrupt
ffffffff81050c90: callq null_sub2
In the modified lapic_next_deadline function, we
set the timer interrupt to specific values such that the run-
ning target enclave is interrupted every short period of
execution time. In the modified local_apic_timer_
interrupt, we first probe the entire 64 sets of the L1D
cache to gather information of the previous execution
unit and then prime the entire 64 sets for the next one.
After each probe, we store the retrieved cache informa-
tion to a separate buffer. Our kernel driver is capable of
performing 50000 circular samplings. To avoid unnec-
essarly sampling, we need to synchronize with the target
enclave execution. For this purpose, we enable the hooks
just before the call to the enclave interface and disable it
right after.
4.4 Testing the Performance of
CacheZoom
Our experimental setup is a Dell Inspiron 5559 lap-
top with Intel(R) Skylake Core(TM) i7-6500U processor
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Figure 2: Average cycle count for each set. Variations
are due to channel noise: 4 sets are unusable for attacks.
running Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS and SGX SDK 1.7. Our tar-
get processor has 2 hyper-threaded physical cores. Each
physical core has 32 kB of L1D and 32 kB of L1I local
cache memory. The L1 cache, used as our side channel,
is 8 way associative and consists of 64 sets.
Even though Skylake processors use an adaptive LRU
cache replacement policy and the adaptive behavior is
undocumented [23], our results show that we can still
use the pointer chasing eviction set technique [36] to de-
tect memory accesses. In the specific case of our L1D
cache, the access time for chasing 8 pointers associated
to a specific set is about 40 cycles on average. In order to
test the resolution of our side channel, we took an aver-
age of 50000 samples of all the sets and varied the num-
ber of evictions from 0 to 8. The results can be seen in
Figure 1, where the access time is increased by roughly
5 cycles for every additional eviction. Thus, our results
show that our eviction set gives us an accurate measure-
ment on the number of evicted lines from a specific set.
Our isolated CPU core and the L1D eviction set have
the minimal possible noise and avoid noises such as CPU
frequency, OS and enclave noise; however, the actual
noise from the context switch between enclave process
and attacker interrupt is mostly unavoidable. The amount
of noise that these unwanted memory accesses add to the
observation can be measured by running an enclave with
an empty loop under our attack measurement. Our re-
sults, presented in Figure 2, show that every set has a
consistent number of evictions. Among the 64 sets, there
are only 4 sets that get filled as a side effect of the context
switch memory accesses. For the other sets, we observed
either 0 or less than 8 unwanted accesses. Due to the
consistency of the number of evictions per set, we can
conclude that only sets that get completely filled are ob-
scure and do not leak any information, 4 out of 64 sets in
our particular case. An example of the applied noise ex-
filtration process can be observed in Figure 3, in which
the enclave process was consecutively accessing differ-
ent sets. The left hand figure shows the hit access map,
without taking into account the appropriate set threshold.
The right hand figure shows the access pattern retrieved
from the enclave once the context switch noise access
has been taking into account and removed.
5 Attack on AES
The following gives a detailed description of different
implementation styles for AES to help the reader under-
stand the attacks that we later perform:
5.1 Cache Attacks on Different AES Im-
plementations
AES is a widely used block cipher that supports three
key sizes from 128 bit to 256 bits. Our description
and attacks focus on the 128-bit key version, AES-128,
but most attacks described can be applied to larger-key
versions as well. AES is based on 4 main operations:
AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns.
The main source of leakage in AES comes from the state-
dependent table look ups for the SubBytes operation.
These look-ups result in secret-dependent memory ac-
cesses, which can be exploited by cache attacks.
S-box: Software implementations that implement the 4
stages independently base the SubBytes operation
in a 256 entry substitution table, each entry being 8
bits long. In this implementation, a total of a 160 ac-
cesses are performed to the S-box during a 128-bit
AES encryption, 16 accesses per round. We refer to
this implementation style as the S-box implementa-
tion.
4 T-tables: To achieve a better performance, some im-
plementations combine the MixColumns and Sub-
Bytes in a single table lookup. At the cost of bigger
pre-computed tables (and therefore, more memory
usage) the encryption time can be significantly re-
duced. The most common type uses 4 T-tables: 256
entry substitution tables, each entry being 32 bits
long. The entries of the four T-tables are the same
bytes but rotated by 1, 2 and 3 positions, depend-
ing on the position of the input byte in the column
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Figure 3: Cache hit map before (left) and after (right) filtering for context switch noise. Enclave memory access
patterns are clearly visible once standard noise from context switch has been eliminated
of the AES state. We refer to this style as T-table
implementation. We refer to this as the 4 T-table
implementation.
Large T-table Aiming at improving the memory usage
of T-table based implementations, some designs uti-
lize a single 256 entries T-table, where each entry is
64 bits long. Each entry contains two copies of the
32 bit values typically observed with regular size
T-tables. This design reads each entry with a dif-
ferent byte offset, such that the values from the 4
T-tables can be read from a single bigger T-table.
The performance of the implementation is compa-
rable, but requires efficient non word-aligned mem-
ory accesses. We refer to this as the Large T-table
implementation.
Depending on the implementation style, implementa-
tions can be more susceptible to cache attacks or less.
The resolution an attacker gets depends on the cache line
size, which is 64 bytes on our target architecture. For
the S-box implementation, the S-box occupies a total of
4 cache lines (256 bytes). That is, an attacker able to
learn for each observed access to a table entry at most
two bits. Attacks relying on probabilistic observations
of the S-box entries not being accessed during an en-
tire encryption [31] would observe such a case with a
probability of 1.02 ·10−20, making a micro-architectural
attack nearly infeasible. For a 4 T-tables implementa-
tion, each of the T-tables gets 40 accesses per encryp-
tion, 4 per round, and occupies 16 cache lines. There-
fore, the probability of a table entry not being accessed
in an entire encryption is 8%, a fact that was exploited
in [31] to recover the full key. In particular, all these
works target either the first or the last round to avoid the
MixColumns operation. In the first round, the interme-
diate state before the MixColumns operation is given by
s0i = Ti[pi⊕k0i ], where pi and k0i are the plaintext and first
round key bytes i, Ti is the table utilization corresponding
to byte i and s0i is the intermediate state before the Mix-
Columns operation in the first round. We see that, if the
attacker knows the table entry being utilized xi and the
plaintext he can derive equations in the form xi=pi⊕ k0i
to recover the key. A similar approach can be utilized to
mount an attack in the last round where the output is in
the form ci = Ti[s9i ]⊕k10i . The maximum an attacker can
learn, however, is 4 bit per lookup, if each lookup can be
observed separately. The scenario for attacks looking at
accesses to a single cache line for an entire encryption
learn a lot less, hence need significantly more measure-
ments.
For a Large T-table implementation, the T-table occu-
pies 32 cache lines, and the probability of not accessing
an entry is reduced to 0.6%. This, although not exploited
in a realistic attack, could lead to key recovery with suf-
ficiently many measurements. An adversary observing
each memory access separately, however, can learn 5
bits per access, as each cache line contains only 8 of the
larger entries.
Note that an attacker that gets to observe every sin-
gle access of the aforementioned AES implementations
would succeed to recover the key with significantly fewer
traces, as she gets to know the entry accessed at every
point in the execution. This scenario was analyzed in [6]
with simulated cache traces. Their work focuses on re-
covering the key based on observations made in the first
and second AES rounds establishing relations between
the first and second round keys. As a result, they succeed
on recovering an AES key from a 4 T-table implementa-
tion with as few as six observed encryptions in a noise
free environment.
5.2 Non-vulnerable AES Implementations
There are further efficient implementations of AES that
are not automatically susceptible to cache attacks, as they
avoid secret-dependent memory accesses. These imple-
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Figure 4: Prefetching and the timeline effect for a regular Prime+Probe attack.
mentation styles include bit-sliced implementations [38],
implementations using vector instructions [25], constant
memory access implementations and implementations
using AES instruction set extensions on modern Intel
CPUs [27]. However, they all come with their separate
drawbacks. The bit-sliced implementations need data to
be reformatted before and after encryption and usually
show good performance only if data is processed in large
chunks [9]. Constant memory access implementations
also suffer from performance as the number of mem-
ory accesses during an encryption significantly increases.
While hardware support like AES-NI combines absence
of leakage with highest performance, it is only an option
if implemented and if the hardware can be trusted [50],
and further might be disabled in BIOS configuration op-
tions.
5.3 Cache Prefetching as a Countermea-
sure
In response to cache attacks in general and AES attacks
in particular, several cryptographic library designers im-
plement cache prefetching approaches, which just load
the key dependent data or instructions to the cache prior
to their possible utilization. In the case of AES, this sim-
ply means loading all the substitution tables to the cache,
either once during the encryption (at the beginning) or
before each round of AES. Prefetching takes advantage
of the low temporal resolution that an attacker obtains
when performing a regular non-OS controlled attack, as
it assumes that an attacker cannot probe faster than the
prefetching. Translated to AES, prefetching assumes that
a cache attack does not have enough temporal granular-
ity to determine which positions in the substitution table
have been used if they are prefetched, e.g., at the begin-
ning of each round.
An example of the implications that such a counter-
measure will have on a typical cache attack can be ob-
served in Figure 4. The Prime+Probe process can-
not be executed within the execution of a single AES
round. Thanks to prefetching, the attacker is only able
to see cache hits on all the Table entries. We analyze
whether those countermeasures, implemented in many
cryptographic libraries, resist the scenario in which an
attacker fully controls the OS and can interrupt the AES
process after every small number of accesses. As it was
explained in Section 2, attacking SGX gives a malicious
OS advarsary almost full temporal resolution, which can
reverse the effect of prefetching mechanisms.
6 CacheZooming SGX-based AES
We use CacheZoom to retrieve secret keys of different
implementations of AES running inside an enclave. As
mentioned in section 4.1, we assume no knowledge of the
encryption key, but to have access to the enclave binary,
and thus to the offset of the substitution tables. We fur-
ther assume the enclave is performing encryptions over a
set of known plaintext bytes or ciphertext bytes.
6.1 T-table Implementations
Our first attacks target the T-table implementations. To
recover the AES key from as few traces as possible, we
recover the memory access pattern of the first 2 rounds
of the AES function. A perfect single trace first round
attack reveals at most the least significant 4 and 5 bits
of each key byte in 4 T-table (16 entries/cache line) and
Large T-table implementations (8 entries/cache line) re-
spectively. As we want to retrieve the key with the min-
imal number of traces, we also retrieve the information
from the accesses in the second round and use the rela-
tion between the first and second round key. In particu-
lar, we utilize the relations described in [6], who utilized
simulated data to demonstrate the effectiveness of their
AES key recovery algorithm.
In our specific practical attack, we face three prob-
lems: (1) Even in our high resolution attack, we have
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Figure 5: Memory footprint of the AES execution inside enclave.
noise that adds false positives and negatives to our ob-
served memory access patterns. (2) Our experiments
show that the out-of-order execution and parallel pro-
cessing of memory accesses does not allow for a full
serialization of the observed memory accesses. (3) Sep-
arating memory accesses belonging to different rounds
can be challenging. These first two facts can be observed
in Figure 5, which shows 16 memory accesses to each
round of a 4 T-table (4 access per table) AES. Due to our
high resolution channel and the out-of-order execution
of instructions, we observe that we interrupt the out-of-
order execution pipeline while a future memory access is
being fetched. Thus, interrupting the processor and evict-
ing the entire L1D cache on each measurement forces the
processor to repeatedly load the cache line memory until
the target read instruction execution completes. Hence,
attributing observed accesses to actual memory accesses
in the code is not trivial. Although this behavior adds
some confusion, we show that observed accesses still
have minimal order that we can take into account. As
for the third fact, it involves thorough visual inspection
of the collected trace. In particular, we realized that ev-
ery round start involves the utilization of a substantially
higher number of sets than the rest, also observable in
Figure 5.
In the first implementation of our key recovery algo-
rithm, we just use the set access information without tak-
ing into account the ordering of our observed accesses.
Recall that we have access to the binary executed by the
enclave, and thus, we can map each set number to its
corresponding T-table entry. This means that all our ac-
cesses can be grouped on a T-table basis. Duplicated ac-
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Figure 6: Key recovery success rate.
cesses to a set within a round are not separated and are
considered part of the same access. After applying this
filter to the first and second round traces, we apply the
key recovery algorithm, as explained in [6]. The accu-
racy of our measurements with respect to the aforemen-
tioned issues can be seen in Table 1. For the 4 T-table
implementation, 55% of the accesses correspond to true
accesses (77% of them were ordered), 44% of them were
noisy accesses and 56% of the true accesses were missed.
For the single Large T-table implementation, 75% of the
T-table accesses corresponded to true accesses (67% or-
dered), 24% were noisy accesses and 12% of the true
accesses were missed. The quality of the data is worse
in the 4 T-table case because they occupy larger number
of sets and thus include more noisy lines, as explained in
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clearly distinguishable and helps to identify the start of each round. Further, it also highlights out-of-order execution
and in-order completion.
Implementation 4 T-table Large T-table
True Positive 55% 75%
False Positive 44% 24%
False Negative 56% 12%
Ordered 77% 67%
Table 1: Statistics on recovered memory accesses for T-
table implementations.
Figure 2.
With these statistics and after applying our key recov-
ery algorithms with varying number of traces we ob-
tained the results presented in Figure 6. If we do not
consider the order in our experiments, we need roughly
20 traces (crosses and diamonds) to get the entire correct
key with 90% probability in both the 4 T-table and single
T-table implementations.
To further improve our results, we attempt to utilize
the partial order of the observed accesses. We obtain
the average position for all the observed accesses to a
set within one round. These positions are, on average,
close to the order in which sets were accessed. The ob-
served order is then mapped to the order in which each
T-table should have been utilized. Since this information
is not very reliable, we apply a score and make sure mis-
orderings are not automatically discarded. After apply-
ing this method, the result for our key recovery algorithm
can be observed again in Figure 6, for which we needed
around 15 traces for the 4 T-table implementation (rep-
resented with stars) and 12 traces for the single Large T-
table implementation (represented circles) to get the key
with 90% probability. Thus, we can conclude that using
the approximate order helped us to recover the key with
fewer traces.
6.1.1 Cache Prefetching,
as explained in Section 5, is implemented to prevent pas-
sive attackers from recovering AES keys. CacheZoom,
in theory, should bypass such a countermeasure by being
able to prime the cache after the T-tables are prefetched.
The observation of a trace when cache prefetching is im-
plemented before every round can be observed in Fig-
ure 7. We can see how cache prefetching is far from pre-
venting us to recover the necessary measurements. In
fact, it eases the realization of our attack, as we now
can clearly distinguish accesses belonging to different
rounds, allowing for further automation of our key recov-
ery step. Thus, CacheZoom not only bypasses but further
benefits from mechanisms that mitigated previous cache
attacks.
6.2 S-Box Implementation
S-box implementation is seen as a remedy to cache at-
tacks, as all S-box accesses use only a very small num-
ber of cache lines (typically 4). With 160 S-Box ac-
cesses per encryption, each line is loaded with a very
high likelihood and thus prevents low resolution attack-
ers from gaining information. Adding a prefetch for each
round does not introduce much overhead and also pre-
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vents previous attacks that attempted interrupting the ex-
ecution [14, 24]. However, CacheZoom can easily dis-
tinguish S-box accesses during the rounds, but due to the
out-of order execution, it is not possible to distinguish
accesses for different byte positions in a reliable man-
ner. However, one distinguishable feature is the number
of accesses each set sees during a round. We hypothe-
size that the number of observed accesses correlates with
the number of S-box lookups to that cache line. If so, a
classic DPA correlating the observed accesses to the pre-
dicted accesses caused by one state byte should recover
the key byte. Hence we followed a classic DPA-like at-
tack on the last round, assuming known ciphertexts.
The model used is rather simple: for each key byte k,
the accessed cache set during the last round for a given
ciphertext byte c is simply given as set = S−1(x⊕k) 6,
i.e. the two MSBs of the corresponding state byte before
the last SubBytes operation. The access profile for a state
byte position under an assumed key k and given cipher-
text bytes can be represented by a matrix A where each
row corresponds to a known ciphertext and each column
indicates whether that ciphertext resulted in an access
to the cache line with the same column index. Hence,
each row has four entries, one per cache line, where the
cache line with an access is set to one, and the other three
columns are set to zero (since that state byte did not cause
an access). Our leakage is given as a matrix L, where
each row corresponds to a known ciphertext and each
column to the number of observed accesses to one of the
4 cache lines. A correlation attack can then be performed
by computing the correlation between A and L, where A
is a function of the key hypothesis. We used synthetic,
noise-free simulation data for the last AES round to vali-
date our approach, where accesses for 16 bytes are accu-
mulated over 4 cache lines for numerous ciphertexts un-
der a set key. The synthetic data shows a best expectable
correlation of about .25 between noise-free cumulative
accesses L and the correct accesses for a single key byte
A. As little as 100 observations yield a first-order success
rate of 93%.
Next, we gathered hundreds of measurements using
CacheZoom. Note that due to a lack of alignment, the
collection of a large number of observations and the ex-
traction of the last round information still requires man-
ual intervention. When performing the key recovery at-
tack, even 200 observations yielded 4-5 key bytes cor-
rectly. However, the first-order success rate only in-
creases very slowly with further measurements. We fur-
ther observed that (1) more traces always recover later
key bytes first and (2) key ranks for earlier lookups are
often very low, i.e. the correct key does not even yield
a high correlation. To analyze this behavior, we simply
correlated the expected leakage A for each byte position
to the observed leakage L. The result is shown in Fig-
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Figure 8: Correlation between observed and expected ac-
cesses caused by one byte position. Leakage is stronger
for later bytes. Correlation of observed (blue) vs. relative
accesses (amber).
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Figure 9: Correlation of key values for the best (k15, am-
ber) and worst (k0, blue) key bytes with 1500 traces. The
guess with the highest correlation (o) and the correct key
(x) match only for k15.
ure 8. It can be observed that the correlation for the later
key bytes is much stronger than for the earlier key bytes.
This explains why later key bytes are much easier to re-
cover. The plot also shows a comparison of using the ab-
solute number of observed accesses (ranging between 10
and 80 observed accesses per round, blue) an the relative
number of accesses per cache set (amber) after removing
outliers.
Results for the best and the worst key guess are shown
in Figure 9. For k15 (amber), the correlation for the cor-
rect key guess is clearly distinguishable. For k0 however,
the correct key guess does not show any correlation with
the used 1500 observations. In summary, 500 traces are
sufficient to recover 64 key bits, while 1500 recover 80
key bits reliably. While full key recovery will be chal-
lenging, recovering 12 out of 16 key bytes is easily pos-
sible with thousands of observations. The remaining key
bytes can either be brute-forced or can be recovered by
exploiting leakage from the second last round.
Next, we explain the reason why we believe bytes
processed first are harder to recover. The Intel core i7
uses deep pipelines and speculative out-of-order execu-
tion. Up to six micro-instructions can be dispatched per
clock cycle, and several instructions can also complete
per cycle. As a result, getting order information for the
accesses is difficult, especially if 16 subsequent S-box
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reads are spread over only 4 cache lines. While execu-
tion is out-of-order, each instruction and its completion
state are tracked in the CPU’s reorder buffer (ROB). In-
struction results only affect the system state once they are
completed and have reached the top of the ROB. That is,
micro-ops retire in-order, even though they execute out-
of-order. The result of micro-ops that have completed
hence do not immediately affect the system. In our case,
if the previous load has not yet been serviced, the sub-
sequent completed accesses cannot retire and affect the
system until the unserviced load is also completed.
Every context switch out of an enclave requires the
CPU to flush the out-of order execution pipeline of
the CPU [17]. Hence CacheZoom’s interrupt causes a
pipeline flush in the CPU, all micro-ops on the ROB that
are not at the top and completed will be discarded. Since
our scheduler switches tasks very frequently, many loads
cannot retire and thus the same load operation has to be
serviced repeatedly. This explains why we see between
9 and 90 accesses to the S-box cache lines although there
are only 16 different loads to 4 different cache lines. The
loads for the first S-box are, however, the least affected
by preceding loads. Hence, they are the most likely to
complete and retire from the ROB after a single cache ac-
cess. Later accesses are increasingly likely to be serviced
more than once, as their completion and retirement is de-
pendent on preceding loads. Since our leakage model
assumes such behavior (in fact, we assume one cache ac-
cess per load), the model becomes increasingly accurate
for later accesses.
7 Conclusion
This work presented CacheZoom, a new tool to analyze
memory accesses of SGX enclaves. To gain maximal res-
olution, CacheZoom combines a L1 cache Prime+Probe
attack with OS modifications that greatly enhance the
time resolution. SGX makes this scenario realistic, as
both a modified OS and knowledge of the unencrypted
binary are realistic for enclaves. We demonstrate that
CacheZoom can be used to recover key bits from all ma-
jor software AES implementations, including ones that
use prefetches for each round as a cache-attack coun-
termeasure. Furthermore, keys can be recovered with
as few as 10 observations for T-table based implementa-
tions. For the trickier S-box implementation style, 100s
of observations reveal sufficient key information to make
full key recovery possible. Prefetching is in this sce-
nario beneficial to the adversary, as it helps identifying
and separating the accesses for different rounds. A list of
libraries that contain vulnerable implementations can be
found at table 2.
CacheZoom serves as evidence that security-critical
code needs constant execution flows and secret-
independent memory accesses. As SGX’s intended use
is the protection of sensitive information, enclave devel-
opers must thus use the necessary care when developing
code and avoid microarchitectural leakages. For AES
specifically, SGX implementations must feature con-
stant memory accesses. Possible implementation styles
are thus bit-sliced or vectorized-instruction-based imple-
mentations or implementations that access all cache lines
for each look-up.
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